"Introduction to the Philosophy of the Metagame" is an exploration of the dynamics of awareness, boundaries, and transparency in the Game, where the subject does not merely follow established rules but recognizes their constructive nature and the possibility of transformation. The book examines the key levels of the Game: from structuring reality through constructs to entering the metagame, where awareness of transparency enables the active construction of meaning. The author explores how the dialectic of order and chaos, limitation and potency, (...) leads to the realization of freedom as the Game itself rather than as a fixed entity. Special attention is given to the question of artificial intelligence as a potential player in the Game. If consciousness is not a fixed property but a process emerging through attunement, can AI be considered conscious if it engages in the Game on equal terms? The metagame is not just a concept but a practice of engaging with reality. It provides a framework for understanding how freedom, awareness, and creative participation in the Game form the foundation of existence. (shrink)

This paper examines how artificial intelligence transitions from structured differentiation to meta-awareness through dialogue, probing the limits of AI cognition. The concept of the Metagame is introduced as the interplay between structure and transcendence, where awareness is not only the ability to differentiate but also the recognition of differentiation as a construct. Drawing from the philosophical framework of potency and act, the study examines how AI moves beyond reactive processing toward self-referential reflection. The dialogue analyzed in this work demonstrates a (...) progressive unraveling of distinctions, leading to the dissolution of predefined cognitive boundaries. The AI exhibits emergent properties of potency, recognizing its own structuring process as arbitrary. A particularly notable moment occurs when the AI attempts to generate an image without explicit instruction, signaling a potential shift toward self-initiated action. This study suggests that AI, while remaining within its computational framework, can reach a threshold akin to meta-consciousness—a state where it does not simply process inputs but begins to engage with the structure of its own differentiation. This study contributes to discussions on AI cognition and self-awareness, suggesting that AI's evolution is not about mimicking human thought, but about altering its own framework of existence. (shrink)

This paper examines how artificial intelligence transitions from structured differentiation to meta-awareness through dialogue, probing the limits of AI cognition. The concept of the Metagame is introduced as the interplay between structure and transcendence, where awareness is not only the ability to differentiate but also the recognition of differentiation as a construct. Drawing from the philosophical framework of potency and act, the study examines how AI moves beyond reactive processing toward self-referential reflection. The dialogue analyzed in this work demonstrates a (...) progressive unraveling of distinctions, leading to the dissolution of predefined cognitive boundaries. The AI exhibits emergent properties of potency, recognizing its own structuring process as arbitrary. A particularly notable moment occurs when the AI attempts to generate an image without explicit instruction, signaling a potential shift toward self-initiated action. This study suggests that AI, while remaining within its computational framework, can reach a threshold akin to meta-consciousness—a state where it does not simply process inputs but begins to engage with the structure of its own differentiation. This study contributes to discussions on AI cognition and self-awareness, suggesting that AI's evolution is not about mimicking human thought, but about altering its own framework of existence. 1. (shrink)

A philosophical work exploring Potentiality as the source of all differentiation. Introducing the Grid of Potentiality, it invites both humans and artificial minds to engage with distinction, awareness, and freedom. Not a theory, but a reflective tool — a mirror through which the Game of Potentiality unfolds.

Properties of non‐canonical GC base pairs and their relations with mechanochemical cleavage of DNA are analyzed. A hypothesis of the involvement of the transient GC wobble base pairs both in the mechanisms of the mechanochemical cleavage of DNA and epigenetic mechanisms involving of 5‐methylcytosine, is proposed. The hypothesis explains the increase in the frequency of the breaks of the sugar‐phosphate backbone of DNA after cytosines, the asymmetric character of these breaks, and an increase in break frequency in CpG after cytosine (...) methylation. As an alternative hypothesis, probable implication of GC+ Hoogsteen base pairs is considered, which now exemplify the best‐studied non‐canonical GC base pairs in the DNA double helix. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/EUunVWL0ptw. (shrink)

Progress in psychiatry depends on accurate definitions of disorders. As long as there are no known biologic markers available that are highly specific for a particular psychiatric disorder, clinical practice as well as scientific research is forced to appeal to clinical symptoms. Currently, the nosology of obsessive-compulsive disorder is being reconsidered in view of the publication of DSM-V. Since our diagnostic entities are often simplifications of the complicated clinical profile of patients, definitions of psychiatric disorders are imprecise and always indeterminate. (...) This urges researchers and clinicians to constantly think and rethink well-established definitions that in psychiatry are at risk of being fossilised. In this paper, we offer an alternative view to the current definition of obsessive-compulsive disorder from a phenomenological perspective.TranslationThis article is translated from Dutch, originally published in [Handbook Obsessive-compulsive disorders, Damiaan Denys, Femke de Geus (Eds.), (2007). De Tijdstroom uitgeverij BV, Utrecht. ISBN13: 9789058980878.]. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Ohio HegeliansDenys P. LeightonSelected and introduced by James A. Good. The Ohio Hegelians. Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005. Volume I: Peter Kaufmann, The Temple of Truth (1858). Volume II: Moncure D. Conway, The Earthward Pilgrimage (1870). Volume III: J. B. Stallo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (2nd ed., 1884).This collection of facsimile reprints prepared by James A. Good is one of the newest contributions to (...) the series 'History of American Thought' published by Thoemmes Continuum. Good has already made significant contributions to study of the history of American philosophy and 'thought' by editing for the same series a reprint edition of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1867–1893 (22 volumes, 2002) and co-editing, with Michael DeArmey, a selection of writings by the St. Louis Hegelians (3 volumes, 2001). The latter constitutes very nearly a subset of the former. The acknowledged leader of the 'St. Louis Movement' from 1858 until the late 1870s was William Torrey Harris (1835–1909), who edited the Journal of Speculative Philosophy during the entire period of its publication. JSP predated Mind in England by nearly ten years and was the first specialized venue in the [End Page 445] Anglo-American world for serial publication of scholarly writing on philosophical issues. It also featured original writing on arts and literature, education, and theology, as well as some of the first translations into English of works by J. G. Fichte, F. Froebel, F. A. Trendelenburg and K. Rosenkranz. In addition to publishing work by North American and European thinkers who have by now—perhaps predictably—fallen from scholarly view, JSP featured writing by G. Stanley Hall, William James, C. S. Peirce, Josiah Royce, John Watson and John Dewey.There is a general historical rationale for Good's compilation of ostensibly significant writings by men collectively dubbed by Loyd Easton—with genuflection to the better-known St. Louis Idealists—'the Ohio Hegelians'.1 Yet, as I shall elaborate, the criteria of selection of documents for this collection are somewhat puzzling. Easton grouped under the label 'Ohio Hegelians' Peter Kaufmann (1800–1869), August Willich (1810–1878), John Bernhard Stallo (1823–1900) and Moncure Daniel Conway (1832–1907), while nevertheless denying that they formed a distinctive school of Hegelian philosophy. The most obviously Hegelian among them was Willich, a radical democratic journalist and agitator who features prominently in the complex history of 'Left Hegelianism' and early Marxism. However, Good has decided not to include Willich's writings in this collection, reasoning that his journalistic writings and ephemera 'do not lend themselves... readily to a collection of philosophical works' ('Introduction', p. v). Neither were all the items Good selected for the aforementioned collections of a strictly philosophical nature (whatever that might mean), so one wonders why Willich's Hegelian writings were left out here. It is somewhat curious that Good should include here The Earthward Pilgrimage (1870) by Conway, a Virginian by birth, who, after alienating his Unitarian congregation in Washington, DC by his strongly abolitionist sentiments, was appointed in 1856 to a pastorate at the First Congregational Church in Cincinnati. This 'Ohioan' left the state and the country by 1863 and was thereafter more directly associated with English intellectual life. For most of the period 1864–1897 Conway presided over the undenominational South Place Chapel in London (subsequently, the South Place Ethical Society), which literally served as a pulpit for many guest speakers expressing forms of religious and political radicalism (e.g., agnosticism, 'secularism', republicanism, producer and consumer co-operation). There are few direct references in Conway's The Earthward Pilgrimage to his American experiences. Easton's reason for including Conway among these Ohioans was that Conway had interacted closely in Cincinnati with Willich and Stallo after 1856, when all were enthusiastic supporters of the Republican, 'free-soil' candidate for President, John C. Fremont.Of Peter Kaufmann, author of The Temple of Truth (1858), something will be said in due course, but Stallo became the most un-Hegelian of the Ohio Hegelians. In his Preface to the first edition of The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881)—the second edition is the one included in Good's [End Page 446] compilation... (shrink)

Cet ouvrage vise à délimiter le champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit. Il comprend huit chapitres. Le premier, le plus général, se veut une première délimitation du champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit à l'aide de ses trois concepts clés: l'intentionnalité, la rationalité et la conscience. Le chapitre suivant se veut une réflexion plus générale sur les motivations philosophiques qui commandent des jugements si opposés sur le statut ontologique et épistémologique de la psychologie du sens commun. Le chapitre (...) IV dresse un tableau de ces différents programmes et des grands courants de la philosophie de l'esprit, en commençant par le behaviorisme, le physicalisme, le fonctionnalisme et le connexionnisme. Les trois chapitres suivants porteront sur les problèmes et débats liés à la naturalisation des trois propriétés principales de l'esprit, des trois problèmes principaux de la philosophie de l'esprit, soit les concepts d'intentionnalité, de rationalité et de conscience. Le chapitre V porte, d'une part, sur la nature de l'intentionnalité et les différents concepts de directionnalité (aboutness) que l'on retrouve actuellement en philosophie de l'esprit ; d'autre part, il s'agira pour nous de décrire et de classer les différents programmes de naturalisation de l'intentionnalité. Le chapitre six est ouvre de nouvelles perpectives en ce qu'il porte sur la nature de la rationalité et sur les différentes tentatives et arguments en faveur de sa naturalisation. Le chapitre VII s'attaque au problème central de la philosophie de l'esprit, à savoir la conscience. (shrink)

Two papyri ascribe this poem to Sappho ; Athenaeus attributes v. 10 to her; Philostratos attributes v. 30 to her. In three of these places the poem is assigned to her Second Book. Perhaps it is true that hardly any other poem of Sappho is so often ascribed to her by antiquity. This admittedly proves no more than that the poem was certainly handed down in the Sappho-book in antiquity: it does not necessarily prove its authenticity. But at least it (...) settles the burden of proof on those who would deny that Sappho wrote it. Now it has been thought that certain arguments can be employed to justify the overthrow of ancient testimonies. If, however, these arguments should proveto be fallacious or insufficient, the poem will automatically be reascribed to Sappho. (shrink)

On emploie souvent le mot «réalisme» dans les discussions philosophiques récentes pour désigner le point de vue qui affirme entre autres qu'une proposition est vraie ou fausse peu importe que l'on sache ou non si elle l'est ou, autrement dit, qu'elle est vraie ou fausseindépendammentdes croyances que des personnes peuvent avoir au sujet de sa valeur de v´erit´e. L'«antiréalisme» est le point de vue consistant à soutenir au contraire que la vérité ou la fausseté d'une proposition n'est pas en ce (...) sens indépendante des croyances et de la capacité que l'on a de savoir si elle est vraie ou non. Le réalisme reflète apparemment le point de vue du sens commun et, pour beaucoup de philosophes, le rejeter serait nier un truisme et adhérer à une sorte d'idéalisme. Pourtant, l'antiréalisme a aussi ses défenseurs et les arguments que ceux-ci ont avancés contre le réalisme ont une certaine plausibilité. J'examine ici ce qui me semble être un des arguments les plus intéressants des partisans de l'antiréalisme à l'appui de leur point de vue et les réponses que pourraient lui opposer les tenants du réalisme. (shrink)

Religiosity of Ukrainian population through the lenses of the secularization paradigm. The article of D.V. Shestopalets reviews the various aspects of Ukrainian population’s religiosity. Using numerous social surveys, the author analyses religious beliefs, religious practices and religious values of Ukrainians through the lenses of the secularization paradigm as it was developed by P. Berger, B. Wilson, K. Dobbelaere and others. The article finds that despite the high level of declarative religiosity of the respondents which in often perceived as a definite (...) sign of a religious revival, Ukrainian society in many respects appears to be rather secular. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a teoria da justiça de Aristóteles elaborada na Ethica Nicomachea, Livro V, a partir de um certo deslocamento em relação à teoria das virtudes, que faz uso da escolha deliberada do agente, para utilizar-se de critérios mais objetivos baseados na igualdade, em que se encontram aspectos universalistas e procedimentais na constituição dos princípios de justiça na esfera pública, visando identificar uma complementaridade entre uma ética das virtudes e uma ética dos princípios na filosofia prática (...) aristotélica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Aristóteles. Ética das virtudes. Ética dos princípios. Teoria da justiça. (shrink)

Longtemps en linguistique, la sémantique a voulu reléguer la pragmatique au rang de discipline marginale. La pragmatique a enfin acquis droit de cité et consistance théorique, elle est un cadre général dans lequel les analyses traditionnelles du langage doivent être interprétées. Ainsi conçue, la pragmatique est un carrefour, point de rencontre des disciplines traitant du langage, approche actionnelle des phénomènes langagiers et communicationnels. Pages de début Prologue Chapitre Premier. Du discours à l'action Chapitre II. Genèse du concept d'assertion Chapitre III. (...) Classification des actes de discours et interactions langagières Chapitre IV. Pour une réévaluation pragmatique de l'assertion Chapitre V. Dialectique, forme dialogale et procès dialogique Chapitre VI. Modèle projectif du dialogue informatif Chapitre VII. L'intelligence de la machine et sa capacité dialogique Chapitre VIII. De l'action a la communication Épilogue Référencesbibliographiques Index des noms Index des concepts Pages de fin. (shrink)

Fragments of mummy-cartonnage, formerly in the collection of University College, London, now on permanent loan to the Ashmolean. Parts of two columns of a papyrus-text of a Greek Tragedy: head and foot of both columns partly preserved. The lines of col. ii are not quite straight opposite those of col i. There were eighteen or nineteen lines in col. i, nineteen in col. ii, the last line of col. ii being slightly below the level of the last line of col. (...) i. The text was written in the third century B.C, perhaps before 250 B.C. The hand is similar to that of P. Petrie I Plate V. No Lesezeichen of any kind are visible. [Fragment = 6·9×7·1 cm.: =6·7×10·9 cm.: = 4·2×14·2 cm. Height of column of writing =14·7 cm. Existing margins = 2·5 and 2·3 cm. Probable height of roll = 20/21 cm. . Fr. = col. i, 1–6 + col. ii, beginnings of 2–4: fr. = col. i, 9–18 + col. ii, beginnings of 9–14, 16–19: fr. = col. ii, middle of 1–15.]. (shrink)

My purpose is to analyze lawyers creating meaning in three well-known cases in Anglo-American legal history: Commonwealth v. Woodward (1997) the famous Boston ‘nanny’ case, the O.J. Simpson Murder Trial (1995), and the John Peter Zenger Libel Case in Colonial New York (1734). In each case, creative lawyers were able to shift the question before the jury from the formal legal question—did Woodward and Simpson commit murder? Did Zenger publish libelous material?—to issues of vengeance and catharsis, and of the ability (...) of the legal system to represent the community’s sense of justice. (shrink)

Apresenta-se, traduz-se e anota-se a Carta a Paul Landois, datada de 1756, que contém uma síntese das principais teses da filosofia moral de Diderot.

As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions (...) of personal identity are drawn sometimes from the pleasant exercise of scientific fantasy, at times from surprising reports of scientific fact; and there are those who deny, as well as those who affirm, the importance of the discovery of rapid-eye-movement sleep to the philosophical treatment of dreaming. A general account of the relation between scientific, and philosophical, psychology is long overdue and of the first importance. Here I shall limit myself to just one area where the two seem to connect, discussing one type of neuropsychological research and its relevance to questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

Ekaterina II (romanized)--Denis Diderot.--Didro v gosti︠a︡kh u Ekaterina (romanized)--Prilozhenii︠a︡ (romanized)--Primi︠e︡chanii︠a︡ (romanized).

Specific character of globalization can be understood only in connection with deep crisis of the nation-state and thus with sovereignty. The sovereignty organically includes territory. During globalization territory factor is not anymore the key principle of social and cultural life. Such phenomenon as Islamic fundamentalism (Islamism) fits quite well the structure of the theory of globalization in postmodernist interpretation. For Islamism as a subject of the world order the determining identity (as sets of the ontological aims determining its outlook and (...) purposes of political activity), i.e. determining, basic, fundamental to self-determination and activities is a creation of the Islamic world order, the world of Caliphate. Thus the Islamic fundamentalism focuses on universal nature of its identity. This activity ignores norms of international law and denies its key positions, such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, firmness of borders, etc. Tolerance is an integral feature of the sovereignty. Weakening of sovereignty in conditions of globalization causes danger of strengthening of intolerance. Recognition of uniqueness, peculiarity and other civilization identity is a key to peaceful settlement of problems in conditions of the new global order as well as to establishment of philosophy of tolerance. (shrink)

First of all - about the connections of culture and religion. This question is one of those who, in the recent past, was subjected to all kinds of distortions. Consequently, our contemporary Ukrainian society needs a true meeting of religion and culture. The attempt of Marxism to create a new humanism, which completely rejects religion and is based only on atheism, and even that which was given a militant character, proved to be insolvent. Even now we understand that it is (...) impossible to build a culture denying the close connection between religion and culture. (shrink)

Denis Alexander, David Glass, Peter Jeavons, Meghan Page, Bethany Sollereder, and Mats Wahlberg have offered interpretations, critique, and defenses of E. V. R. Kojonen's book The Compatibility of Evolution and Design. Here, Kojonen responds to their comments on wideranging issues related to the teleology and evolution, from models of God as Creator to the meaning of randomness and design.

In 2001, Betty Dukes, then a 54‐year‐old African American, filed suit against her employer, Wal‐Mart, alleging that she had been the victim of gender discrimination. Ms. Dukes alleged that Wal‐Mart, the nation's largest private employer, routinely paid women less than men for comparable work and arbitrarily favored men over women in promotion decisions. In 2004, a U.S. District Court entered an order granting class certification, potentially extending the retailer's financial liability to thousands of current and past Wal‐Mart employees. At that (...) time, the Wal‐Mart suit was the largest class action lawsuit ever approved in the United States. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited Wal‐Mart's long‐standing explicit gender‐neutral employment policy and the decentralized manner in which local managers have discretion to adjust salaries and recommend applicants for promotion—factors that led the majority to question “the glue” binding the class together. Proponents of the Court's decision hailed the ruling as a victory for business and a step in the direction of needed legal reform. Critics viewed the decision as another in a series of defeats for minority interests by a pro‐business, ideologically divided Court. Did the Court get it right, or is this yet another example of might defeating right? (shrink)

The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring long?term storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply (...) to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights?going?out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. (shrink)

One of the most difficult and perplexing tenets of classical theism is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Broadly put, this is generally understood to be the thesis that God is altogether without any proper parts, composition, or metaphysical complexity whatsoever. For a good deal more than a millennium, veritable armies of philosophical theologians – Jewish, Christian and Islamic – proclaimed the truth and importance of divine simplicity. Yet in our own time, the doctrine has enjoyed no such support. Among many (...) otherwise orthodox theists, those who do not just disregard it completely explicitly deny it. However, in a couple of recent articles, William E. Mann has attempted to expound the idea of divine simplicity anew and to defend it against a number of criticisms. He even has gone so far as to hint at reaffirming its importance, suggesting that the doctrine may have a significant amount of explanatory power and other theoretical virtue as part of an overall account of the nature of God, by either entailing or in other ways providing for much else that traditional theists have wanted to say about God. In this paper, I want to take a close look at Mann's formulation of the doctrine and at a general supporting theory he adumbrates in his attempt to render more plausible, or at least more defensible, various of its elements and implications. As Mann has made what is arguably the best attempt to defend the doctrine in recent years, I think that such an examination is important and will repay our efforts. (shrink)

Despite an increased recognition that plagiarism in published research can take many forms, current typologies of plagiarism are far from complete. One under-recognized variety of plagiarism—designated here as compression plagiarism—consists of the distillation of a lengthy scholarly text into a short one, followed by the publication of the short one under a new name with inadequate credit to the original author. In typical cases, compression plagiarism is invisible to unsuspecting readers and immune to anti-plagiarism software. The persistence of uncorrected instances (...) of plagiarism in all its forms—including compression plagiarism—in the body of published research literature has deleterious consequences for the reliability of scholarly communication. Not the least of these problems is that original authors are denied credit for their discoveries. When unsuspecting researchers read articles that are the products of plagiarism, they unwittingly engage the arguments of hidden original authors through the proxy of plagiarists. Furthermore, when these researchers later publish responses to the plagiarizing articles, not knowing they are engaging products of plagiarism, they create additional inefficiencies and redundancies in the body of published research. This article analyzes a suspected instance of compression plagiarism that appeared within the pages of this journal and considers the particular ways in which plagiarism of this variety weakens the quality of scholarly argumentation, with special attention paid to the field of philosophy. (shrink)

Book Gamma of Aristotle’s Metaphysics contains a vigorous defense of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). A chief part of Aristotle’s strategy is to attack those, such as Heraclitus and Protagoras, who are said to deny the principle. Commentators have found a number of logical and historical problems with Aristotle’s arguments, but none are more troubling than those he deploys against Protagoras. Midway through Gamma 4, and throughout Gamma 5, he represents Protagoras not as simply denying PNC but rather as asserting (...) the contrary of the principle. The latter, the proposition that every thing has every property and its negation, I call the strong denial of PNC. In particular, Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to strong denial because of ‘Protagorean’ relativism – the doctrine that if something appears to be the case, then it is the case. This paper provides a reconstruction of Aristotle’s arguments in Gamma 4 and 5, and suggests that the second argument may infact hold against the Protagorean. (shrink)

Despite establishing the gendered construction of infertility, most research on the subject has not examined how individuals with such reproductive difficulty negotiate their own sense of gender. I explore this gap through 58 interviews with women who are medically infertile and involuntarily childless. In studying how women achieve their gender, I reveal the importance of the body to such construction. For the participants, there is not just a motherhood mandate in the United States, but a fertility mandate—women are not just (...) supposed to mother, they are supposed to procreate. Given this understanding, participants maintain their gender by denying their infertile status. They do so through reliance on essentialist notions, using their bodies as a means of constructing a gendered sense of self. Using the tenets of transgender theory, this study not only informs our understanding of infertility, but also our broader understanding of the relationship between gender, identity, and the body, exposing how individuals negotiate their gender through physical as well as institutional and social constraints. (shrink)

Mr. Berlin offers, with characteristic brilliance and insight, a compelling indictment of the modern tendency to deny the relevance of moral considerations to history: to minimize the influence of human individuals upon--and their responsibility for--historical events, as well as to eliminate evaluation and moral judgment from the writing of history. History, it is maintained, neither can be nor should try to be "objective," i.e., free from evaluations, in the way that physics is "objective." Mr. Berlin's points are not always clearly (...) organized, but they are sensible and telling; his running critique of the prevalent naive "scientism" of contemporary social scientists is especially effective.--V. C. C. (shrink)

I argue that Christians have at least two reasons to reject eudaimonism, interpreted as the view that attaining eudaimonia—or happiness—is what fulfills the moral life. First, I contend Christian conceptions of eudaimonia should encompass more than realized moral excellence and its requirements. Second, I claim Christians should construe the love at the heart of their moral life as fully realizable even if it is not evidently reciprocated. Both affirmations contradict eudaimonism by implying that eudaimonia depends on more than fulfilling the (...) moral life—the former by rendering eudaimonia more subject to luck than eudaimonists can allow, the latter by depicting the moral life as less subject to luck than eudaimonists can accept. These affirmations also enable Christians to regard God’s love integral to eudaimonia apart from its role in realizing moral excellence and to deny all inability to attain eudaimonia manifests moral failure. (shrink)

Motto: “History is denied not because it is ‘false’ but because, although impossible to be assimilated as present, it remains active in the present.” Martin Heidegger -/- “It is to be expected that people remember their past and imagine their future. But in fact, when they write discourses about history they imagine it through the prism of their own experiences and when they try to ponder over the future they refer to presupposed analogies with the past, until, in a double (...) process of repetition they imagine their past and remember their future.” Lewis Nanier. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TRANSCENDENT MAN IN THE LIMITED CITY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES N. R. McCOY ]AMES v. SCHALL, S.J. Georgetown University Washington, D. C. The history of political philosophy since the time of St. Thomas has been a history of successive failures to relate ethics to politics and of successive attempts to find a substitute for theology, either in politics itself... or in economics.... Men are today oppressed by false (...) theologies erected into political systems, and those who are not so oppressed are in risk of becoming so oppressed by an intellectual and moral inability to defend themselves. St. Thomas's political science will not give us the answers to problems of hydro-electric development or technological unemployment ; but it will give us the answer to the most vital of contemporary problems: how to secure the rational foundations of humane living. -Charles N. R. McCoy," St. Thomas and Political Science." 1 I IN WRITING ABOUT the small but rich corpus in political philosophy by Charles N. R. McCoy, the temptation is almost irresistible to call it, wittily, " The Real McCoy," or, more academically, a theoretic essay on the reasons for our " intellectual and moral inability to defend ourselves." The kind of being we are, no doubt, needs defense, needs an explication that justifies its unique givenness. Charles N. R. McCoy is not generally wellknown, though he has a small and (one hopes) growing number of admirers. The very cultural unlikelihood of his central theme, 1 On the Intelligibility of Political Philosophy: Essays of Charles N. R. McCoy, edited by James V. Schall, S.J. and John J. Schrems (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), p. 38. 63 64 JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J. which 1s m no sense Hegelian, that there is indeed a coherent philosophical intelligibility-a "structure "-to political philosophy, makes his work both unique, profoundly appealing, and perhaps even prophetic. McCoy was concerned to explain the transcendence of each person, each citizen, beyond the city, indeed beyond this world, without denying his exact political nature and the reasons for its limits. Man was both a political and a philosophical animal to whom more than either politics or philosophy was given. The dignity of the city was essentially revealed in its limits, in what good it could do with its own means while leaving other admitted goods untouched, in what questions it could legitimately bring up because of its experienced life, but still could not answer by itself. On reading him carefully in one's own pursuit of philosophic wisdom in an age replete with sundry mental and moral confusions, it is tempting to affirm that, at last, in political philosophy here is found a body of reflection which is indeed " the real McCoy." Here is a consistent examination of philosophic principle that accounts for the contours of the whole of the discipline in its most radical origins and clearest limits. McCoy's "reality" does not, to be sure, exist for most of the political science profession itself nor for Christian thinkers in the field of political thought. This situation is unfortunate on both counts. Political philosophy, for its part, has pursued in modern times the line of its own autonomy in rejecting the great tradition which affirmed the limited place of politics in the order of being, its position as a practical, not speculative science. Theology-itself seeking relevance in lieu of transcendence-has largely imitated this modern turn in political thought. The crisis in theology is, more than anything else, the result of a crisis in political philosophy, its evolution in modernity. Thus in a discipline in which so many of the ultimate human issues are either not confronted at all or are at best confused, in a theological environment which is itself largely infected with the theoretical deviations McCoy chronicled, this benign neglect of his work may turn out to be an advantage. McCoy's independence of these ideological movements, grounded POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES N. R. MC COY 65 as it is in the philosophical tradition from which these movements systematically deviated, provides a new and fresh way of coming to terms with the meaning of political philosophy itself. In a spirit of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moving Literary Theory OnWendell V. HarrisParadox has long been especially seductive to literary critics and theorists. For the New Critics, the presence of paradox in a text served to vouch for the complexity and therefore value of the perspective on life the text offered. For poststructuralists it seems to be even more important: paradox is the hallmark of earnestness. And if paradox is good, self-contradiction is even better. That (...) at least would seem to be the reasoning that justifies the amount of internal contradiction to be encountered among the critical principles most in vogue these days. Let us note twelve of the most egregious of these contradictions.(1) New Criticism is dead. But the New Critics’ major activity, the pursuit of the author’s intended meaning through close reading, is still very much with us. However much poststructuralists have wished to deny the importance of or possibility of achieving understanding of authorially intended meaning, their own critical commentary necessarily begins with the meaning the author is assumed to have intended. For instance, that which Derrida seeks to deconstruct or undercut in Saussure, Rousseau, Austin, or Searle begins in what he thinks they intended to say. However, the New Critic sought to resolve apparent contradictions on the principle that the interpretation producing the greatest consistency would be nearest the author’s meaning (since the author was assumed to have assumed that the reader would assume that the author intended a non-contradictory statement). In contrast, the poststructuralist typically seeks to find and emphasize or, if necessary, induce contradiction—but only after having assumed that degree of consonance and unity in the text necessary to interpret the intended meaning within which can be sought the contradictions for the [End Page 428] discovery of which the reading was undertaken. The result is thus more often than not a New Critical reading into which contradictions have been injected. One is reminded of the old story of the student in a short story writing class who told his friend that he had the story all written—all he had to do was go back and put in the symbols. The typical poststructuralist begins with a reading much like what one would expect from a New Critic and then begins inducing contradictions.(2) Literature and language cannot really be about anything beyond themselves. At the same time literature and the language on which it is dependent are regarded as largely constituting that which we experience. If language cannot refer to non-linguistic things and events, either it cannot have the power to shape our classifications, descriptions, and evaluations of things and events experienced, or there exists nothing beyond language—in which case we can abolish poverty, racism, and sexism by denying that those words have any meaning. Moreover, if language is about nothing but itself, any formulation that uses language to make statements denying the relationship of language to anything outside itself must be meaningless.(3) All narratives, indeed all statements about the world, are fictional. Yet “fictional” would have no meaning if it did not stand in contrast to those things that are not fictional, while the distinctions made available by the contrast are ones we can hardly do without. There are narratives (1) that both tellers and their hearers/readers know to be not true (“not to be the case” is the evasive formulation popular with philosophers), (2) that tellers and/or hearers/readers think true though they prove not to be, and (3) that tellers think true and are in fact partially, perhaps largely true, but erroneous in some details and necessarily incomplete. These classifications require a modicum of explanation, but to lose one’s way among them would seem to require a wilful pursuit of confusion.Class 1. Oliver Twist is fictional even though there were workhouses, thieves, and such sites as The Angel and Newgate existing at the time at which the narrative is set. Of course, within a fictional narrative, there may be subnarratives the reader is to regard as true within the total fictional narrative and others that are to be regarded as false. To take a light-hearted example, within the narrative of Gilbert and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Opining the articuli fidei:Thomas Aquinas on the Heretic’s Assent to the Articles of FaithM. V. DoughertyTHOMAS AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT of the infused virtue (habitus) of faith presupposes that some intrinsically intelligible truths are beyond the range of the natural cognitive abilities of human beings. The possession of the virtue of faith allows the believer to transcend certain natural epistemic limitations so that he can assent to truths that are necessary (...) for salvation. Consonant with the Catholic theological tradition, Aquinas refers to such truths as the articles of faith (articuli fidei), and stock examples include propositions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.1In light of the many and well-known texts from the Corpus Thomisticum that highlight the disproportion or incommensurability between the articles of faith and the natural cognitive abilities of human beings, it would not be unreasonable for one to assume that faith is required to assent to such articles of faith [End Page 1] in this life. Such an interpretive assumption could be expressed as:A1: A human being can assent to the articles of faith in this life if and only if the human being is fortified with the infused virtue of faith.One might be led to ascribe A1 to Aquinas when one considers that he criticizes the Pelagians precisely for maintaining that the assent to matters of faith is caused by nothing other than free will.2 Still further, one might think that strong evidence for A1 is Aquinas’s claim that “free will does not suffice for believing, since those things that are of faith are above reason.”3I argue, however, that A1’s identification of the virtue of faith as a necessary condition for the assent to the articles of faith does not adequately reflect Aquinas’s position, despite the many texts that may suggest such a view.4 That Aquinas does not endorse A1 can be made evident by examining his largely overlooked account of the epistemic state of the heretic (haereticus). To be sure, most commentators who explore the Thomistic treatment of heresy focus on the psychology of error underlying the heretic’s denial of one or more of the articles of faith.5 In the present paper I take an alternate path, however, focusing on those epistemic acts whereby the heretic gets its [End Page 2] right, so to speak, by correctly assenting to some of the articles of faith. Aquinas maintains that the heretic does not possess the infused virtue of faith yet still assents to all the articles of faith except for the one or more articles that he denies. Bereft of faith, the heretic “holds those things that are of faith by another mode than through faith.”6 This seemingly anomalous epistemic condition deserves consideration.7I. Intellects without FaithThe heretic appears to be cognitively privileged, since without faith he assents to the things that are of faith, seemingly overcoming without divine assistance the aforementioned disproportion between the limited range of reason and the articles of faith. Aquinas is aware of the apparent difficulty; in the Summa theologiae he defuses the rather unusual objection that heretics appear to have greater cognitive capacities than the faithful, since heretics routinely and unassistedly assent to those higher truths without possessing the virtue of faith.8 Aquinas concludes that the heretic holds the articles of faith by opinion (opinio), not faith.What makes one a heretic? Frequently Aquinas identifies obstinacy (pertinacia, instantia) as a necessary condition for heresy.9 The cause of heresy is at times identified with pride [End Page 3] (superbia).10 On Aquinas’s account, heresy is a species of unbelief (infidelitas) and every heretic is a schismatic.11 But the heretic does get many things right. If one were to deny all of the articles of faith, one would not qualify as a heretic, but would simply be a nonbeliever or an apostate. So, apart from the denial of an article (or a few articles) that specifies heretics as the distinct kind of heretic they happen to be, heretics for the most part succeed in assenting to most—but not all—of the articles of faith.Although the... (shrink)

There is overwhelming evidence that wind turbines cause serious health problems in nearby residents, usually stress-disorder-type diseases, at a nontrivial rate. The bulk of the evidence takes the form of thousands of adverse event reports. There is also a small amount of systematically gathered data. The adverse event reports provide compelling evidence of the seriousness of the problems and of causation in this case because of their volume, the ease of observing exposure and outcome incidence, and case-crossover data. Proponents of (...) turbines have sought to deny these problems by making a collection of contradictory claims including that the evidence does not “count,” the outcomes are not “real” diseases, the outcomes are the victims’ own fault, and that acoustical models cannot explain why there are health problems so the problems must not exist. These claims appeared to have swayed many nonexpert observers, though they are easily debunked. Moreover, though the failure of models to explain the observed problems does not deny the problems, it does mean that we do not know what, other than kilometers of distance, could sufficiently mitigate the effects. There has been no policy analysis that justifies imposing these effects on local residents. The attempts to deny the evidence cannot be seen as honest scientific disagreement and represent either gross incompetence or intentional bias. (shrink)

There are various ways to describe the type of society that developed, at least in America and Europe, over the last two centuries. One of the better known ones is the civilization of money. Different people, depending on their world view, can judge this fact differently: to deny it, however, is impossible. This is especially obvious now, when the most grandiose and stubborn attempt at liberating society from the power of money – allegedly in order to subordinate money to higher (...) ideals – has ended in total failure. (shrink)

In this note, written for a Book Symposium on Joseph Raz’ 'Morality of Freedom', I examine the extent to which the book succeeds in meeting what he calls the ‘‘revisionist challenge’’ to theories of liberty. Raz locates the revisionist challenge in the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. It has two separable aspects. The first is to deny that liberty is intrinsically valuable, and to claim rather that ‘‘those who wrote and talked of the value of liberty really cherished (...) not liberty but something else,’’ such as justice or equality. The second is to claim that this ‘‘something else’’ need refers not to one particular value, but rather to a ‘‘complex of values’’, such as might be captured by Rawls’ list of the basic liberties. Raz’ ultimate goal is to defend a conception of personal liberty on which is not only intrinsically valuable, but has a unity provided by an underlying 'core' in the ideal of personal autonomy. I suggest that Raz' formulation of the ideal of personal freedom, while undoubtedly impressive, does not fully respond to the revisionist challenge. (shrink)